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Investors · 7 min read

The Five-Year Grace Period: What Dollar Shave Club Really Teaches About Fake Moats

Emrah ·

Gillette had every reason to crush Dollar Shave Club the moment it launched. It didn't move for years, and the reason why separates a real competitive barrier from a temporary head start.

The Story

In March 2012, a small company called Dollar Shave Club launched with a low-budget video and a simple pitch: cheap razor blades delivered to your door every month, no trip to the pharmacy required. Gillette, owned by Procter & Gamble, controlled most of the razor market at the time. It had manufacturing scale, shelf space in every drugstore in the country, and a brand built over more than a century.

On paper, Gillette could have answered within months. It had the money to undercut any price Dollar Shave Club offered and the distribution to put a subscription option in front of every existing customer. It did not do this. For years, Dollar Shave Club grew largely unbothered, built a loyal subscriber base and a brand voice of its own, and in July 2016 sold to Unilever for roughly a billion dollars. Gillette's own direct response, a service called Gillette on Demand, along with a round of price cuts, did not arrive until 2017, about five years after Dollar Shave Club had entered the market.

That gap is the part worth studying. Gillette was not slow because it lacked resources or didn't notice. Matching Dollar Shave Club's price and subscription model directly would have undercut its own premium pricing in the exact stores that were generating most of its profit. Fighting the new entrant on its own terms meant attacking its own business first. That reluctance held for years. It just did not hold forever.

The Idea

This pattern has a name in Hamilton Helmer's 2016 book 7 Powers: counter-positioning. A newcomer builds a business model that a larger, established competitor does not copy, not because it lacks the resources, but because copying would damage the profits it already earns from its existing model. The barrier here is not technical. Nobody at Gillette lacked the engineering talent to build a subscription razor service. The barrier was economic self-interest, and for a while, that held up better than most technical barriers do.

Strategy professor Roger Martin, who co-authored Playing to Win with former P&G CEO A.G. Lafley, took a closer look at this idea in a 2024 essay and raised a pointed objection. Counter-positioning, on its own, is not a durable competitive advantage. It is a temporary condition that lasts only as long as the incumbent keeps choosing not to respond, and that choice can change. Martin frames the distinction through what he calls the Can't/Won't Test: a real, lasting barrier requires the competitor to be structurally unable to copy you, not simply unwilling. A company that can't copy you stays blocked regardless of how big the threat gets. A company that won't copy you is running a cost-benefit calculation, and calculations change when the numbers change. Martin points to a similar dynamic with Olay's push into mass retail against prestige skincare brands like Estée Lauder, where the incumbent's reluctance to compete directly through the same channels held for a period but was never a permanent wall.

How Founders Should Read This

Founders who benefit from counter-positioning tend to read an incumbent's silence as proof they have won. The bigger company isn't responding, so the model must be safe. Martin's framework suggests the opposite reading: that silence is a countdown, not a verdict, and the clock is tied to a number the founder rarely gets to see directly, which is the point at which ignoring the threat costs the incumbent more than fighting it would.

Dollar Shave Club's actual advantage was not that Gillette would never respond. It was what the company built while Gillette chose not to: a direct relationship with millions of subscribers, a brand personality that felt nothing like a legacy shaving company, and pricing and packaging habits that were hard to walk back once customers had them. When Gillette finally did respond with its own subscription option and lower prices in 2017, it was competing against a company that already had five years of loyalty behind it, not a company still relying on the fact that nobody had copied it yet.

The practical lesson for a founder building on this kind of positioning is to treat the head start as a resource with a deadline attached, not as evidence that the deadline doesn't exist. The specific exercise worth doing is naming the actual threshold: what size, what revenue, what press coverage would make it too expensive for the incumbent to keep looking away. Then ask honestly whether the business will still be standing on something real once that threshold is crossed.

How Investors Should Read This

For an investor, Martin's Can't/Won't Test turns a vague defensibility conversation into a specific one. When a founder says a competitor won't copy their model, the next question should not be whether that's true today. It should be which category the reluctance falls into, and what would move it from one to the other.

A can't is stable. A won't is a bet on how long an incumbent will keep leaving money on the table rather than admit its old model is under threat, and that bet gets worse the more successful the startup becomes, because success is exactly what shifts the calculation. This matters directly for how a fund underwrites a company built on counter-positioning. A portfolio built on power-law outcomes needs a handful of companies to reach outsized terminal value, and terminal value assumes the barrier is still standing years after the check is written, well past the point an incumbent typically starts paying attention. The diligence question worth asking is not just how big the current lead is, but what the company has built underneath that lead that survives the day the incumbent's math flips. A founder who has a specific, credible answer to that question is underwriting something real. A founder whose only answer is "they haven't copied us yet" is asking an investor to price in a deadline nobody has named.

Where the Two Views Collide

Picture the exact meeting inside Gillette sometime between 2012 and 2016 when Dollar Shave Club's growth stopped being a footnote in a market report and started showing up as a line item worth discussing at the board level. Nobody outside that room knows precisely when it happened, but something like it did, because the response eventually came.

Every quarter that passed without that meeting happening felt, from the outside, like proof the model was safe. It wasn't proof of anything except that the meeting hadn't happened yet. The more useful question was never whether Gillette had responded. It was how close Dollar Shave Club was getting to the size where a response became unavoidable, and whether the subscriber relationships and brand it had built by then could survive that response landing. Reading the same set of facts as a countdown instead of a verdict is the entire difference this framework is built to teach.

The founders and investors who get the most value out of this framework are the ones willing to put a number on that threshold instead of treating the incumbent's patience as a permanent feature of the market. Dollar Shave Club's team, whether or not they used Helmer's language for it, seem to have understood they were working against a clock. That is a large part of why there was still a real company left to sell when Gillette finally moved.

The Takeaway

Name the threshold before someone else's silence convinces you it doesn't exist. What has to be true about your size, your revenue, or your visibility before a bigger competitor's calculation flips from won't to will? And once it does, what part of what you've built stays yours regardless?

A founder or investor who can answer both questions is underwriting a business that is compounding something real underneath a temporary head start. One who can only point to the fact that nobody has copied them yet is pricing in a deadline nobody has bothered to name.


Source: Roger Martin, "7 Powers & Playing to Win," 2024 — rogermartin.medium.com/7-powers-playing-to-win-936cfdb94f86

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